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Abstract— The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus serves as a 
legacy protocol for in-vehicle data communication. Simplicity, 
robustness, and suitability for real-time systems are the salient 
features of the CAN bus protocol. However, it lacks the basic 
security features such as massage authentication, which makes it 
vulnerable to the spoofing attacks. In a CAN network, linking 
CAN packet to the sender node is a challenging task. This paper 
aims to address this issue by developing a framework to link each 
CAN packet to its source. Physical signal attributes of the 
received packet consisting of channel and node (or device) which 
contains specific unique artifacts are considered to achieve this 
goal. Material and design imperfections in the physical channel 
and digital device, which are the main contributing factors 
behind the device-channel specific unique artifacts, are leveraged 
to link the received electrical signal to the transmitter. Generally, 
the inimitable patterns of signals from each ECUs exist over the 
course of time that can manifest the stability of the proposed 
method.  Uniqueness of the channel-device specific attributes are 
also investigated for time- and frequency-domain. Feature vector 
is made up of both time and frequency domain physical 
attributes and then employed to train a neural network-based 
classifier. Performance of the proposed fingerprinting method is 
evaluated by using a dataset collected from 16 different channels 
and four identical ECUs transmitting same message. 
Experimental results indicate that the proposed method achieves 
correct detection rates of 95.2% and 98.3% for channel and ECU 
classification, respectively. 
Keywords— Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus, ECU 
Fingerprinting, In-vehicle Network Communication Security 
I. INTRODUCTION  
      The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol is 
widely used for embedded systems networking. It finds a wide 
range of applications from automotive, aerospace, agriculture, 
medical devices, and even in some of the home and 
commercial appliances [1].  
 
A modern vehicle contains many different computing devices, 
known as Electronic Control Unit (ECU), which are 
responsible for sensing and controlling actuators [2].  
Virtually, all functionalities in the modern automobiles 
ranging from engine control to braking, lighting, driver safety, 
antilock brake systems (ABS) and the parking assist systems 
are achieved through these ECUs [3]. These ECUs 
communicate with each other through different networks. If 
the communication on these networks is not secured, it can 
pose a serious threat to the safety of the passengers.  
      The CAN-bus has been a de-facto standard for 
communication as an in-vehicle network for over 30 years. By 
design, the CAN-bus lacks basic security features such as 
message authentication option which makes it vulnerable to a 
variety of spoofing attacks [4].  For example, in the absence of 
effective message authentication, a single compromised ECU 
allows the attacker to take full control of the vehicle by 
injecting spoofed messages [2,5,6]. Since CAN packets 
contain no authenticator field, any ECU on the network can 
impersonate the other ECUs in the network. This provides a 
broad range of internal as well as external attack surfaces [7]. 
An adversary can leverage the CAN-Bus protocol 
vulnerabilities to launch various attacks leading to 
malfunctioning of the vehicle.  Data encryption-based 
solutions are proven to be inefficient for the CAN-Bus 
protocol [7]. Lack of the channel encryption provides the 
adversary an opportunity to sniff the network traffic by simply 
plugging in a low-price hardware leading to the replay attacks 
[8]. 
Attack surfaces are growing by the course of time which 
gives rise to develop the effective protection of CAN-bus 
communication from malicious attackers as a challenging task. 
The automakers are aiming for a fully-connected intelligent 
vehicle which makes secure in-vehicle communication 
problem even more complicated. Recently, researchers have 
proposed many solutions for in-vehicle networks security at 
different layers e.g. physical layer [14,23] and data link layer 
by using various types of message authentication methods 
[7,15,16,22]. 
In this paper, we propose a method to link the received 
packet to its transmitter based on the unique physical 
properties of the signal. The proposed physical-fingerprinting-
based method exploit unique artifacts both at the digital device 
(ECU) level and in the physical channel (e.g., CAN-bus). 
Material and design imperfections in the channel and the 
transmitter are the main contributing factors behind these 
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unique artifacts. The physical channel unique artifacts, which 
are used to link received electrical signal to the source (or 
transmitting) ECU, are considered in this study. More 
specifically, the proposed method exploits physical channel 
dependent attributes for linking received signals (message) to 
the transmitting device. The proposed method can be 
leveraged as an identification method in such a way that if an 
adversary tries to send a malicious message either from an 
external ECU or by changing the cables, it can be 
distinguished as a malicious activity and based on the defined 
safety specifications proper actions can be performed.  Even if 
an adversary uses the legitimate message identifier (e.g. shut 
down engine), since he/she is sending that message from an 
external ECU, the proposed method can detect that signal has 
not originated from the legitimate one because the signal will 
not pair with the ECU that should have generated that 
message. It has been observed that uniqueness of the physical 
attributes exists both in time and frequency domain. In this 
paper, a feature vector consisting of 11 time and frequency 
domain statistical signal attributes including higher-order 
moments, spectral flatness measure, minimum, maximum, and 
irregularity K are considered to capture the channel and the 
transmitter dependent uniqueness. A multi-layer neural 
network based classifier is trained and tested for source ECU 
and the source channel. Experimental results indicate that the 
proposed attributes can be used to classify different channels 
and ECUs. Performance of the proposed fingerprinting 
method is evaluated on a dataset collected from 16 different 
channels and four identical ECUs transmitting the same 
message. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed 
method achieves correct detection rates of 95.2% and 98.3% 
for channel and ECU classification, respectively. 
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents an overview of CAN-bus protocol. Section III 
provides a brief overview of the related work in the area of 
CAN-Bus security and authentication techniques.  Details of 
the proposed method are outlined in Section IV and 
experimental results and analysis are explained in Section V 
then conclusion and future directions are discussed in Section 
VI. 
II. CAN-BUS PROTOCOL: AN OVERVIEW 
    The CAN-Bus is the broadcasting based communication 
topology where each node receives the transmitted messages. 
However, each node accepts the messages with a particular ID 
and discards the others. Depending on the node configuration 
and its functionalities, the communication of the network is 
filtered which means that each node only accepts particular 
message not all the incoming messages. Message transmission 
on the network is event-driven [11].  The CAN messages are 
identified based upon the identifier field, denoted as ID.  The 
ID is used for prioritizing the messages as well to avoid the 
collision in case of contention between nodes to transmit at the 
same time. The message with the lower ID has higher priority 
for winning the contention. For example, if two different 
nodes tend to transmit the messages with the identifier value 
of 0x12 and 0xF4 at the same time, the message with ID 0x12 
is sent first due to the lower value. There are two formats for 
CAN-bus namely standard format which has 11-bit identifier 
and extended format with 29-bit identifier [12].             
 In automotive industry, differential signal voltage is mostly 
used for the physical layer signaling using two communication 
wires e.g. CAN-High and CAN-Low [7]. Shown in Figure 1 is 
the bit transition and signal voltages of CAN bus 
communication which includes series of dominant and 
recessive bits. When a recessive bit (logical 1) is transmitting 
both CAN-High and CAN-low are driven to the 2.5 volts 
which indicates that the voltage difference is zero during the 
transmission of recessive bit and when a dominant bit (logical 
0) is transmitted, CAN-High goes to 3.5 volts and CAN-Low 
goes down to the 1.5 that means the voltage difference in the 
dominant bit is 2 volts [13]. As a result, if two nodes are trying 
to publish on the bus simultaneously then dominant bit will 
win the arbitration. Therefore, it can be concluded that: “the 
lower the value of identifier is, the higher will be the priority 
to win the arbitration and publish data on the bus”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1. CAN-bus differential signal representations 
III. RELATED WORK 
      Recently, the research community has shown a growing 
interest and attention on CAN-Bus security.  For example, Cho 
and Shin [14] proposed a clock skew based framework for 
ECU fingerprinting and use it for the development of Clock 
based Intrusion Detection System (IDS).  The proposed clock 
based fingerprinting method [14] exploited clock characteristic 
which exists in all digital systems, that is, “tiny timing error 
known as clock skew”. The clock skew identification exploits 
uniqueness of the clock skew and clock offset which is used to 
identify a given ECU based on clock attributes of the sending 
ECU. Cho and Shin [14] also developed a prototype of the 
proposed IDS and demonstrated effectiveness of the proposed 
CIDS on three different vehicles e.g. Honda Accord, Toyota 
Camry, and a Dodge Ram.                 
 Wang et al. [7] developed a practical security framework 
for vehicular systems (VeCure) in which they implemented the 
message authentication code (MAC) for the CAN-bus. The 
VeCure method realized by developing a proof-of-concept 
testbed on Freescale automotive evaluation board.   In their 
method, each node which sends message should also send 
another 8-byte message for authentication. High computational 
cost is one of the limitation of the proposed method. For 
example, it requires 2000 additional clock cycles. 
 Hiroshi et al. [15] proposed a security authentication 
 
monitoring system for CAN-Bus which uses MAC for 
protecting CAN bus against spoofing attacks. The role of 
monitoring node in their proposed method is to authenticate 
each ECU and verified the authentication code which is 
defined for each CAN message. The modified CAN controller 
is required to install for their monitoring node to implement the 
message authentication which transmits an error frame to 
overwrite spoofed message. Additionally, if the monitoring 
node is compromised or removed from the bus, the entire 
network is compromised.    
  Hazem et al. [16] proposed a Lightweight CAN 
Authentication Protocol LCAP. The proposed method requires 
to append a “magic number” which can be generated on the 
one-way hash function employed in TESLA protocol [21] for 
the message to be verified from the receiver side. Handshake 
technique is used for node synchronization and channel 
security. It requires 2 bytes of the data field for the 
authentication code which only creates small overhead for 
message authentication code exchange among the nodes. 
However, since the LCAP introduces the new IDs in the 
network configuration, it requires large address space.   
IV. PROPSED METHOD: CHANNEL RESPONSE BASED ECU 
IDENTIFICATION  
     The proposed transmitted identification method relies on 
the fact that each electronic device (e.g. ECU) and channel 
impulse response of the physical channel (e.g., CAN-Bus) 
exhibit unique artifacts which can be used for linking received 
signal to the sending ECU. More specifically, by extracting 
the distinguishable statistical features of transmitting signals, 
the source of the coming message is identified.  
 Let Si(t) be the output of the i
th ECU and hj(t) be the 
impulse response of the jth physical channel between ith ECU 
and the physical fingerprinting (PhyFin) unit. The physical 
signal at the input of the PhyFin unit,y
ij
(t), can be expressed as 
Equation 1 and Figure 2, respectively. 
y
ij
(t)= hj(t)* Si(t) 
where, * denotes convolution operator. 

 
 
 
Fig. 2. Physical input signal and channel response  
 
      Physical signal at the input of PhyFin unit, 𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑡) is used 
for linking 𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑡) to its source. Shown in Figure 3 are plots of 
four waveforms at the output of four different channels when 
identical message is applied at the input of these channels. It 
can be observed from Figure 3 that channel impulse response 
is different for all four channels, which validates our claim of 
channel specific uniqueness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Waveforms of the received signals from four different CAN-bus 
channels with identical channel input message. 
Various feature extraction methods, both in time and 
spectral domain are evaluated here. To validate effectiveness 
of the proposed method here, feature extraction method 
presented in [17] is considered. To this end, 40-dimensioanl 
scalar features both in time and spectral domain are extracted 
using LibXtract - a library for feature extraction [18]. The 
extracted feature set is then analyzed further to select relevant 
features. FEAST Toolbox is applied [19,] which utilizes the 
joint mutual information criterion, for ranking the features. 
Details of the selected time- and frequency-domain features 
are shown in Table I and Table II, respectively. The feature 
selection process resulted in an 11-D feature vector for 
channel and ECU identification.   
TABLE I.  TIME DOMAIN FEATURE SET 
Feature name Equation 
Maximum mij = (Min(yij(i)) | i=1…N) 
Minimum Mij=(Max(yij(i)) | i=1…N) 
Mean 
μ
ij
= 
1
N
 ∑ y
ij
(i)
N
i=1
 
Variance 
σij
2=√
1
N-1
 ∑ y
ij
(i)-μ
ij
N
i=1  
Skewness 
ρ
ij
= 
1
N
 ∑ (
y
ij
(i)-μ
ij
σij
)
3N
i=1
 
Kurtosis 
κij= 
1
N
 ∑ (
y
ij
(i)-μ
ij
σij
)
4
-3
N
i=1
 
 
TABLE II.  FREQUENCY DOMAIN FEATURE SET 
Feature Name Equation 
Spectral 
Std-Dev σs=√( ∑  (yf(i))
2
*(y
m
(i))) / ∑ (y
m
(i))Ni=1
N
i=1  
Spectral 
Skewness  ρ
s
= ( ∑  y
f
(i)(y
m
(i)) /
N
i=1
σs
3 
Spectral 
Kurtosis  κs=( ∑  (ym(i)-Cs)
4
*y
m
(i)) /
N
i=1
σs
4-3 
Spectrum 
Centroid  Cs=( ∑  yf(i)ym(i)) /( ∑ ym(i))
N
i=1
N
i=1
 
Irregularity-K 
IKs= ∑ | ym(i)
N-1
i=2
-
y
m
(i-1)+y
m
(i)+y
m
(i+1)
3
 | 
ym and yf are the magnitude and the frequency vectors respectively 
 
 
A. Experimental Setup 
Three different type of channels, GXL, TXL, SAE J1939-
15, are used for CAN-Bus. These channels are being used 
actively in real vehicles. Details of the channel types and 
channel lengths are outlined as follows:  
 GXL primary automotive cable is used for engine 
compartment where high resistance is required according 
to SAE J1128. [20] 
 TXL is also primary automotive cable used for 
applications requiring smaller diameters and minimal 
weight. 
 CAN-bus data cables SAE J1939-15 which is used for 
connecting different ECUs to network.  
The technical specification of each channel is provided in 
Table III.  Six (6) channel lengths are considered to realize 
CAN-Bus with pairs of twisted wires from same manufacturer 
and gauge. Overall, the experimental setup contains following 
hardware and software components:  
 Four (4) Arduino Uno R2 microcontroller kits  
 Four (4) CAN-Bus shield board with MCP2515 CAN-bus 
controller and MPC2551 CAN transceiver.  
 Three (3) different types of Cables (GXL, TXL, and 
CAN-bus data cable) with multiple lengths: 0.5 meter, 1 
meter, 2 meter, 3 meter, 4 meter, and 5 meter.  
 Oscilloscope DSO1012A for the voltage samples 
recording with Sampling Rate of 2GSa/s, 100MHz 
bandwidth, and 8-bit vertical resolution. 
 Script for sending an identical message continuously from 
different channels and ECUs to observe the unique 
patterns of signals from each channel and ECU. 
 MATLAB R2016a software for statistical data analysis of 
sampled signals. 
B. Dataset description  
Performance of the proposed algorithm is evaluated for 
both CAN-Bus channel and ECU classification. To this end, 
physical signal is captured at the output of three different cable 
families with multiple lengths (0.5 meter, 1 meter, 2 meters, 3 
meters, 4 meters, and 5 meters) and four identical ECUs with 
same input CAN-bus message. To this end, a dataset for the 18 
channels and four identical ECUs is collected. For each data 
collection setting, 144000 (3600*40) samples are collected. 
For performance evaluation, random partitioning is performed 
to divide the dataset into the training and test set (Training set: 
65%, Test set: 35%). The dataset used here is collected in the 
same environment i.e. under the same temperature and using 
an identical message to observe the minute and unique 
variation of the digital signals. 
 
                                                                                     TABLE  III. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OF THREE  DIFFERENT CABLE FAMILIES 
Type AWG Conductor Insulation No. of 
Strands 
Temperature Compliances 
GXL 18 Bare copper Cross-linked Polyethylene 
(XLP) 
16x30 -40°C -125°C Ford ESB-(M1L85-A), Chrysler (MS8900), SAE-J-
1128. 
 
TXL 18 Bare copper Cross-linked Polyethylene 
(XLP) 
19x30 -40°C -125°C Ford (M1L-123A), Chrysler (MS-8288), SAE-J-1560 
 
CAN-bus 
Data cable 
18 Bare copper Cross-Linked Polyolefin 
(XLPO),  Thermoplastic 
Polyurethane (TPU) 
19x31 -45°C -125°C SA J1939-11 Physical Media, RoHS, SAE J1128 
performance (fluid, flame propagation) 
 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
       Performance of the proposed method is evaluated through 
a series of experiments for channel as well as ECU 
identification. To achieve this goal, a multilayer neural 
network based classifier is trained on randomly selected 65% 
data for each channel and ECU. The trained classifier is then 
employed to test performance of the proposed methods on 
remaining 35% data. Classification accuracy is used to 
measure performance of the proposed method.   
A. Experiment 1: Channel Identification 
The main objective of this experiment is to validate 
uniqueness of channel specific features. Material and design 
imperfections for each specific physical channel is the leading 
factors behind the channel specific unique artifacts. To 
validate this claim, data is recorded for each cable family and 
each channel length with identical channel input, transmitted 
using the same ECU. Specifically, for this experiment ‘cable 
type’ and ‘length’ are the only variables. During the training  
 
 
phase, the neural network is trained for classifying three 
different cable family and six corresponding channel lengths 
(e.g., GXL: 0.5 meter, GXL: 1 meter, GXL: 2 meter, GXL: 3 
meter, GXL: 4 meter, and GXL: 5 meter and so on). A 
multilayer neural network is trained with “scaled conjugate 
gradient back propagation” training algorithm, 11 inputs 
variables (time and frequency domain), 6 outputs which 
corresponds to different lengths of GXL cable, stopping 
criteria of Epochs = 2000, gradient = 1e-7, and three hidden 
layers with 50,40, and 40 hidden nodes respectively. Shown in 
Figure 4 is the architecture of the multilayer neural network 
trained for channel classification.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Neural Network architecture of channel classifier 
 
      Shown in Table IV.A and IV.B are the confusion matrices 
of the channel (C) classification averaged over all cable types 
for the training and test phase. It can be observed from Table 
IV that that the proposed method for channel classification 
achieves overall correct detection rate of 97.6% and 95.2% for 
the training and test phase, respectively.  It can also be noticed 
that 0.5 meter and 1 meter channels exhibit relatively higher 
false rates for both training and testing, these false rates can be 
attributed to the fact that both channel lengths are not very 
different. The signal characteristics uniqueness exists for each 
family type cable and the corresponding lengths.              
             TABLE IV.A. TRAINING CONFUSION MATRIX FOR CHANNEL CLASSIFIER 
  
  
  
  
  
  
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 C
la
ss
 
C1 365 
15.6% 
4 
0.2% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
98.9% 
1.1% 
C2 30 
1.3% 
378 
16.2% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
92.6% 
7.4% 
C3 2 
0.1% 
0 
0.0% 
376 
16.1% 
12 
0.5% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
96.4% 
3.6% 
C4 1 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
8 
0.3% 
382 
16.3% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
97.7% 
2.3% 
C5 0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
388 
16.6% 
0 
0.0% 
100% 
0.0% 
C6 0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
394 
16.8% 
100% 
0.0% 
 91.7% 
8.3% 
99.0% 
1.0% 
97.9% 
2.1% 
97.0% 
3.0% 
100% 
0.0% 
100% 
0.0% 
97.6% 
2.4% 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6  
Target Class 
              TABLE IV.B. TEST CONFUSION MATRIX FOR CHANNEL CLASSIFIER 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 P
re
d
ic
te
d
 C
la
ss
 
C1 176 
14.0% 
10 
0.8% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
94.6% 
5.4% 
C2 22 
1.7% 
205 
16.3% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
90.3% 
9.7% 
C3 3 
0.2% 
3 
0.2% 
203 
16.3% 
9 
0.7% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
93.1% 
6.9% 
C4 1 
0.1% 
0 
0.0% 
13 
1.0% 
197 
15.6% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
93.4% 
6.6% 
C5 0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
212 
16.8% 
0 
0.0% 
100% 
0.0% 
C6 0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
206 
16.3% 
100% 
0.0% 
 87.1% 
12.9% 
94.0% 
6.0% 
94.0% 
6.0% 
95.6% 
4.4% 
100% 
0.0% 
100% 
0.0% 
95.2% 
4.8% 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6  
Target Class 
B. Experiment 2: ECU Identification 
     The purpose of this experiment is to validate that different 
ECUs even from the same make and model introduce different 
artifacts while transmitting an identical message. To achieve 
this goal, dataset for all four ECUs transmitting same 
messages over the same channel is used. In this experiment, 
ECU is the only variable while other variables are kept 
constant. To this end, data for all four ECUs transmitting same 
messages over the 2-meter unshielded CAN-Bus data cable is 
used for training and testing. A multilayer neural network 
classifier is trained with “scaled conjugate gradient back 
propagation” training algorithm, 11 input variables (both time 
and frequency domain), 4 outputs which pertains to each 
ECU, stopping criteria of Epochs = 2000, gradient = 1e-7, and 
one hidden layer with 20 hidden nodes included. Shown in 
Figure 5 is the architecture of the multilayer NN trained for 
channel classification.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Neural Network architecture of ECU classifier 
     Shown in Table V.A and V.B are the classification 
performance of the proposed system in terms of confusion 
matrices of the ECU (E) classification for the training and test 
phases, respectively. It can be observed from Table V that the 
proposed method for ECU classification achieves overall 
success detection rate of 99.6% and 98.3% during the training 
and test phase, respectively.  
TABLE V-A. TRAINING CONFUSION MATRIX FOR ECU CLASSIFIER 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 P
re
d
ic
te
d
 C
la
ss
 
E1 389 
24.9% 
0 
0.0% 
3 
0.2% 
0 
0.0% 
99.2% 
0.8% 
E2 0 
0.0% 
398 
25.5% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
100% 
0.0% 
E3 3 
0.2% 
0 
0.0% 
379 
24.3% 
0 
0.0% 
99.2% 
0.8% 
E4 0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
398 
24.9% 
100% 
0.0% 
 99.2% 
0.8% 
100.% 
0.0% 
99.2% 
0.8% 
100% 
0.0% 
99.6% 
0.4% 
E1 E2 E3 E4  
Target Class 
TABLE V-B. TEST CONFUSION MATRIX FOR ECU CLASSIFIER 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 P
re
d
ic
te
d
 C
la
ss
 
E1 200 
23.8% 
0 
0.0% 
6 
0.7% 
0 
0.0% 
97.1% 
2.9% 
E2 0 
0.0% 
202 
24.0% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
100% 
0.0% 
E3 7 
0.8% 
0 
0.0% 
212 
25.2% 
0 
0.0% 
96.8% 
3.2% 
E4 1 
0.1% 
0 
0.0% 
0 
0.0% 
212 
25.2% 
99.5% 
0.5% 
 96.2% 
3.8% 
100.% 
0.0% 
97.2% 
2.8% 
100% 
0.0% 
98.3% 
1.7% 
E1 E2 E3 E4  
Target Class 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
      In this study, we have demonstrated that for an identical 
CAN-Bus message, underlying physical channel leaves 
inimitable characteristic artifacts in the signals at the channel 
output. These artifacts are unique to different channel lengths 
and ECUs.  The received physical signal therefore can be used 
for linking received CAN packet to actual transmitter.  
Statistical attributes in time and frequency domain are utilized 
for channel and device identification. The performance of the 
classification method is evaluated by carrying out the 
experimental setup for three different CAN-Bus channels with 
six multiple lengths and four ECUs from the same 
manufacturer. The experimental results and analysis indicate 
that the proposed method achieves the satisfactory CAN-Bus 
channel and ECU identification performance with the overall 
correction rate of 95.2% and 98.3%, respectively. For the 
future work, development of an identification platform for 
security purposes will be investigated to determine whether 
the received message is from the compromised ECU or 
legitimate one by leveraging these unique signal 
characteristics. 
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